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By Ronald Chester. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1982. Pp. xii, 235. $18.95.

INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY.

Reducing the incidence of federal estate and gift taxes is one element of
President Reagan's "supply side" economics. Support for such a program
has long existed, and an equally vocal group of commentators has taken the
opposite position. The commentators argue, on primarily egalitarian
grounds, that the transfer of wealth from one generation to the next should
either be abolished or significantly limited. In Inheritance, Wealth, and Society, Ronald Chester clearly aligns himself with the latter group; all but
the uninitiated will find his facile arguments unpersuasive. Moreover,
Chester's failure to offer a unique solution to the taxing of inheritances further undermines his work's utility. Notwithstanding these shortcomings,
Chester must be credited with providing a brief su"mmary of the arguments
on both sides of the current debate as well as an excellent historical account
of the competing schools of thought, beginning with early Western Europeans such as Kant and Mill and concluding with modem American theorists
such as William Shultz and Milton Friedman. These two virtues make the
book mandatory reading for those desiring an initial exposure to the inheritance taxation debate; however, those who are already familiar with the
area will probably find Chester's analysis unsatisfactory.
In the first quarter of his work, Chester provides an historical account of
Western views on inheritance taxation. Chester presents this account in
three parts. The first examines Western European thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and reviews the works of such thinkers as
John Locke and John Stuart Mill. 1 The second part presents the theories
that dominated early American thought. 2 Chester concludes the historical
account by discussing views of twentieth-century theorists such as Milton
Friedman and James Britton.3
Chester establishes his framework for analysis by dividing the modem
theorists into two groups: Those who favor increased inheritance taxation
to promote equal opportunity and those who favor complete freedom to
dispense one's wealth after death. In the second quarter of his work,
Chester analyzes the libertarian arguments against inheritance reform and
finds them unpersuasive. This analysis is the book's major failing. After
spending seventy pages presenting historical information, Chester devotes
only fifteen pages to the two modern theories, of which only four present
rebuttals to the libertarian objections to inheritance reform (pp. 84-88).
The space allotted to these arguments reflects the cursory treatment they
receive.
I. Chester also discusses the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Hobbes, William Blackstone, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo.
2. Chester discusses the views of Jeffersonians, the triumvirate of "rational jurists" James Kent, John Marshall and Joseph Story, and the transcendentalists, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Theodore Parker, and Orestes A. Browson.
3. Chester also discusses the works of William Schultz, Lester Thurow, Gordon Tullock,
Richard Wagner, and Friederich Hayek.
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The second half of Inheritance, Wealth, and Society examines three distinct issues of inheritance tax reform. The first is whether charitable foundations would survive an increase in transfer taxes. Chester believes that
charitable foundations are desirable (p. 124), so he attempts to establish
that inheritance tax reform would not lead to their demise. He achieves this
objective by showing that an increase in estate tax rates, together with a
reduction in the unlimited marital deduction and standard exemption,
would double estate tax revenues, without reducing the current level of
charitable bequests (pp. 110-11). He also suggests increased use of the cy
pres doctrine so that greater amounts of money will be devoted to charitable purposes (pp. 122-24).
In discussing the second issue, Chester concludes that increasing estate
taxes and reducing deductions will not totally effectuate his objective of
erecting equal opportunity in America's capitalistic system. Recognizing
this fact, Chester takes aim at one common method of perpetuating wealth
- the trust. Chester's criticisms of what he terms "dynastic trusts" operate
at two levels. In general, he argues that trusts not only inhibit innovative
use of risk capital (p. 129), but also increase the concentration of wealth (p.
125). Chester also provides a specific reform proposal: abolishing spendthrift trust provisions and the Chajlin doctrine. He supports his proposal by
voicing the familiar arguments that both trust doctrines enable the dead
hand to govern too long (pp. 128, 136), and that spendthrift trusts needlessly prejudice creditors of beneficiaries (p. 136).
Chester's claims suffer from two deficiencies. First, none are original.
Second, the author's casual assumption of the normative importance of
equality over individual autonomy avoids argument over the central issue
in the dispute. Of course, since the issue depends on premises rather than
deductions or observations, argument is singularly unlikely to change the
opinions of the participants. But in preaching to the committed instead of
reasoning with the unenlightened, Chester obscures the normative dimensions of the controversy without improving the persuasiveness of his
position.
Chester's final argument for inheritance tax reform is that such reform
will decrease property crime. Central to Chester's analysis is the concept of
"relative deprivation": the poor's desire for material possessions of others
of greater financial means.4 Chester establishes that it is the perception of
relative deprivation (p. 149), exacerbated by advertising (pp. 150, 158), that
causes the poor to commit property crimes (pp. 153-57). He concludes that
"[b]y removing excess inherited wealth, we remove a major stumbling block
to the achievement of both the reality and the perception of equal opportunity. These achievements should in tum substantially reduce property
crime" (p. 159).
Those familiar with the myriad variables associated with the occasion of
property crime will find this argument somewhat dubious. Reams of social
science evidence associating criminality with unemployment, family relationships, drug abuse, and a host ofless plausible factors diminish the pos4. Relative deprivation involves four elements: "(I) not having something; (2) wanting it;
(3) comparing oneself to similar others who have it; and (4) feeling that its attainment is possible" (p. 146).
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sible role of relative deprivation. Those unacquainted with research along
these lines may find it simply incredible that changes in the arcane details
of estate taxation might significantly affect the behavior of typical street
offenders. And the committed libertarian will view this argument as a justification for additional protection against crime rather than as a warrant for
restrictions on personal control of private property.
Chester concludes by presenting his proposal for inheritance tax reform.
First, he endorses John Stuart Mill's position that intestate succession
should be limited to lineal heirs, who can only receive a " 'reasonable
amount,' " and that those talcing by bequest will receive an amount to provide a " 'comfortable existence.' " (p. 165). Chester also suggests that "[n]et
worth and consumption taxes may also be advisable as a supplement" (p.
166).
The remainder of the last chapter explores a number of unrelated topics
surrounding inheritance taxation such as the issue of whether a substantial
redistribution of wealth can be achieved without suffocating the economy
(pp. 166-70), the prospects of success of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 (pp. 173-74), and an evaluation of a proposed periodic tax on wealth
(pp. 175-79). It concludes with a brief rehash of the libertarian versus equal
opportunity debate, spiced with a cursory critique of Lester Thurow's The
Zero-Sum Society. As one might expect, Chester criticizes Thurow for his
lack of concern with vertical equity - the distribution of the burdens between the rich and the poor (p. 185).
Chester claims that Inheritance, Wealth, and Society is written for
"America's public decision- and policy-makers" (p. 1). A more accurate
description would contain the modifier, "who want an introduction to inheritance tax reform issues,'' for the principal virtue of Chester's work is
that it provides both an historical account of the inheritance issues and a
concise summary of the current debate between libertarians and those, like
Chester, who want to use inheritance taxation to "[insure] equal starting
places for . . . children." Except for these virtues, his work has little to
commend it. Chester's proposals are not new, and his strong allegiance to
the equal opportunity camp distorts his analysis. As a result, his work will
appeal to a limited audience.

